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Abstract 
This paper presents an authentication and key agreement mechanism for multi-domain wireless networks using 
bilinear pairings. Based on the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption and the random oracle model, we show that 
the proposed scheme is secure against an uncertified user and a malicious registration server simultaneously. As 
compared with the recently proposed schemes, our scheme enjoys less computational cost and has higher security 
level by exploiting the certificateless public key cryptography system. Moreover, our scheme can be used to mutual 
authentication and key agreement between members of distinct domains where all the servers use different system 
parameters. Efficiency analysis of related the security and computation overheads are given to demonstrate that our 
scheme is well suited for mobile devices with limited computing capability. 
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1. Introduction 
Now, handheld devices are popularly used by people and many mobile applications have been rapidly 
developed. Considering the limited computing capability of smart cards or mobile devices, the security 
scheme design based on traditional public-key systems is a nontrivial challenge because most 
cryptographic algorithms require many expensive computations. In 2006, Das et al. [1] proposed an 
efficient ID-based remote user authentication scheme with smart cards using bilinear pairings. Goriparthi 
et al. [2] showed that their scheme is insecure against forgery attack resulting in an adversary can always 
pass the authentication. Lately, Giri and Srivastava [3] proposed an improved scheme to withstand the 
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forgery attack. Unfortunately it was shown by Tseng et al. [4] that [3] has too expensive computational 
cost for smart cards with limited computing capability and is unable to be used for a multi-server 
environment and proposed a more efficient scheme. In 2010, Wu and Tseng [5] pointed out these above 
schemes do not provide mutual authentication and key agreement between the client and the server. 
Subsequently, Yoon and Yoo [6] analyzed the efficiency problem of the protocol [5] and then proposed a 
more efficient protocol that can reduce some hash operations and provide same security levels with an 
explicit key confirmation. However, all of schemes above face the key escrow issue as a result of 
adopting identity-based cryptography system. Moreover, their schemes assume that a single PKG will be 
responsible for issuing secret keys to members of a large-scale network or assume that different PKGs 
will share common system parameters.      
In this paper, we propose a mutual authentication and key exchange mechanism for multi-domain 
wireless networks using bilinear pairings based on certificateless public key cryptography proposed by Al-
Riyami and Paterson [7]. Currently, many CL-based cryptographic schemes such as signature schemes [8, 
9] and authenticated key agreement protocols [10, 11] have been proposed for low-bandwidth channels 
and/or low-computation power. The smart card is a low power computing device while a server is regarded 
as a powerful node in the wireless networks. We shift the computational burden to the powerful node and 
reduce the computational cost required by smart cards. Compared with other secure schemes for wireless 
network regarding the security and computation overheads, we believe that our scheme is more efficient 
and more suitable for handheld devices with low computational capabilities on wireless communication. 
Our scheme has the following merits: (1) Users needn’t submit their passwords to the registration server 
and they can freely choose and change their password without any assistance from the server; (2) The 
bilinear pairing operations to be computed only at the server side, and our scheme adopts CL-based short 
signatures to further induce the user computational cost. This makes our scheme especially attractive for 
the applications with a powerful server and number of handheld devices with low computational 
capabilities. (3) The scheme can be used to mutual authentication and key agreement between members of 
distinct domains using different system parameters. (4) The scheme is secure against an uncertified user 
and a malicious registration server simultaneously under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. 
2. Proposed Scheme 
In the following, we present our authentication and key agreement mechanism for multi-domain 
wireless networks using bilinear pairings based on certificateless public key cryptography. Unlike the 
scheme [3], in our proposed scheme each service server does not keep the system private keys to 
authenticate users. Users do not need to register with each service server individually and remember 
several identifiers and the corresponding secrets. Compared to the schemes [4,5,6], our scheme can be used 
to mutual authentication and key agreement between members of distinct domains using different system 
parameters, and our scheme is secure against an uncertified user and a malicious registration server 
simultaneously. The details of algorithms in the proposed scheme are given as follows: 
Setup phase: 
Suppose G1-i is an additive cyclic group of prime order qi, and G2-i is a multiplicative cyclic group of 
the same order. We assume that solving CDHP is hard in group G1-i. Suppose Pi is a generator of G1-i. 
There exists a bilinear pairing map iˆe from G1-i×G1-i to G2-i and cryptographic hash functions H1-i : 
{0,1}n→G1-i, H2-i : {0 ,1}n×G1-i×{0 ,1}n×G1-i→G1-i and H3-i : G1-i→ *qiZ . A server selects a random number 
si ∈ *qiZ as the private key and computes the public key Ppub-i= siPi. Suppose RS obtains his private key s1  
and system public parameters are <G1-1,G2-1, 1ˆe ,q1,P1,Ppub-1,H1-1,H2-1,H3-1>, and SS chooses his private key 
s2 and system public parameters are <G1-2,G2-2, 2eˆ ,q2,P2,Ppub-2,H1-2,H2-2,H3-2>.  
Registration phase: 
A user U first generates his username IDU, then he submits his identity IDU to the registration server 
RS for registration. The registration server RS computes QU=H1-1(IDU) and uses his private key s1 to 
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computes DU=s1QU. Finally, RS loads 1ˆe , P1, Ppub-1, H1-1, H2-1, H3-1, DU, QU and IDU into a smart card and 
issues the smart card to the user U. The server stores the IDU into its database. 
Mutual Authentication and Key Agreement phase: 
This phase is executed whenever a user wants to log into the remote server to access the services. This 
phase is further divided into login, user authentication, server authentication and key agreement phases. In 
the login phase, user sends a login request to the SS. The SS first authenticates the user and then 
authenticates itself to the user. Finally, they establish a common session key after mutual authentication 
for the security of subsequent session message.  
[Login phase]: 
In the login phase, if the user U wants to access the SS with the identity IDSS, U inserts his smart card 
into the terminal, for the first time, the smart card asks the user U to enter his password, U selects his 
password sU ∈ 1*qZ , and then the smart card computes U’s public key PKU=sUP1, the smart card stores sU 
and PKU. Otherwise, the user enters his identity IDU, his password and the service identity IDSS. The 
smart card performs the following steps: 
1. The smart card computes Q’=H1-1(IDU) and PK’=sUP1, and then checks if Q’=QU and PK’=PKU. If 
they are correct, it continues next step, otherwise, terminates the operation 
2. The smart card acquires the system public parameters of SS and the current time stamp T1, then 
selects one random nonce x∈ 1*qZ , computes R1=xP2, W=H2-1 (IDU, PKU, T1, R1) and V=DU +sUW. 
3. Finally, the smart card sends the login message σ= (IDU, IDSS, T1, R1, V) to the service server SS, 
the login message can be viewed as a signature (R1, V) on the message (IDU, IDSS, T1).  
[User Authentication Phase]: 
As receives the login message (IDU, T1, R1, V) at time T2. The service server SS performs the following 
operations to verify the login message. 
1. The SS first verifies the validity of IDU and IDSS, then verifies the time interval between T2 and T1. 
If (T2-T1)≦ Δ t, the SS proceeds to the next step. Otherwise, the login message is rejected. Here Δ t 
denotes the expected valid time interval for transmission delay. 
2. The SS computes W=H2-1 (IDU, PKU, T1, R1) and accepts the login message if and only if the 
following equation holds: 1 1ˆ ( , )e P V = 1 1 1ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )U pub Ue eQ P W PK− , otherwise the SS rejects it. 
3. If the login message is correct, the SS acquires the current time stamp T3 and selects one random 
nonce y∈ 2*qZ , then computes R2=yP1, KB1=yPKU and Auth=H3-2(KB1). Finally, the SS sends (R2, T3, 
Auth) to the user U. 
[Server Authentication Phase]: 
As receives the authentication message (R2, T3, Auth) at time T4. The user U verifies the validity of the 
time interval between T3 and T4 for transmission delay. If T3 is valid, the user authenticates the service 
server SS by checking whether Auth=H3-2(KA1), where KA1= sUR2. It is obvious that 
KA1=sUR2=ysUP1=yPKU=KB1. 
[Key Agreement Phase]: 
After mutual authentication between the user U and the service server SS, they respectively computes 
the session key MKA=H(KAB||KA1) and MKB=H(KAB||KB1)=MKA=MKAB, where KAB 
=IDU||PKU||T1||R1||IDSS||Ppub-2||T3||R2 and H is a key derivation function. Thus, we come to the conclusion 
that the two communication entities successfully established a common session key MKAB. 
Password Change Phase: 
This phase is invoked whenever the user U wants to change his password. This phase does not require 
any interaction with the servers and works as follows: 
1. U inserts the smart card into the terminal and enters his identity IDU and password sU. The smart 
card computes Q’=H1-1(IDU) and PK’=sUP1, and then checks if Q’=QU and PK’=PKU. If they are correct, 
it continues next step, otherwise, terminates the operation. 
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2. The smart card allows U to submits a new password 'Us , then the smart card computes 'UPK = ' 1Us P . 
The smart card stores new sU’ and 'UPK . 
3. Security Analysis 
For certificateless cryptosystems, the widely accepted notion of security was defined by Al-Riyami 
and Paterson in [7], there are two types of adversary with different capabilities: 
Type I Adversary: This type of adversary A1 models a dishonest user who does not have access to the 
master private key of registration server but has the ability to replace the public key of any entity with a 
value of his choice. 
Type II Adversary: This type of adversary A2 models a malicious registration server who has access to 
the master private key but cannot perform public keys replacement. 
On one hand, we show that the service server can authenticate the user. In our scheme, the login 
messages (IDU, T1, R1, V) is viewed as a signature (R1, V) on the message (IDU, IDSS, T1). For the 
adversary A1, he can not forge the correct R1=xP2 and V=DU+sUW to satisfy 
1 1ˆ ( , )e P V = 1 1 1ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )U pub Ue eQ P W PK−  without private keys pair of the user (sU, DU) under the assumption of 
CDHP. For the adversary A2, he knows the other part of private key DU of the user, but he without the 
user’s other private key sU, he can not compute sUW under the assumption of CDHP. Hence, the adversary 
Ai(i=1,2) cannot forge a valid signature on the message (IDU, IDSS, T1) and the service server can 
authenticate the user. 
On the other hand, we prove that the user U can authenticate the service server. In our scheme, after 
user authentication phase, the service server generates the authentication message (R2, T3, Auth), the user 
can compute and verify the Auth value by running an instance of our authenticated key agreement 
protocol. We prove that adversary Ai(i=1,2) in following Theorem 1 cannot compute the Auth value.  
Theorem 1. The server authentication scheme is secure, provided that H3-2, H1 is random oracles and 
the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard. Specifically, assume that adversary Ai(i=1,2) has non-
negligible advantage Adv(Ai) in computing authentication value Auth, making at most qc Create-User 
queries and qp Password-Extract queries. Let qn be the total number of the oracles that Ai creates. Then 
there exists an algorithm C solve the CDH problem with an advantage 2( ) ( ) / ( )c p i c nq q Adv A q q− ⋅ .
Proof. We assume the simulator C receives a random instance (P, aP, bP) of the Computational 
Diffie-Hellman problem. His goal is to compute abP. C will run Ai as a subroutine to solve the CDH 
problem with non-negligible probability. To maintain consistency between queries made by Ai, C keeps 
the following lists: L1 for query/response pairs to random oracle H1; Lu of the queries made by Ai to the 
Create-User oracle and Lh of some of the queries made by Ai to the H3-2 oracle. At the beginning of the 
game, C gives Ai the system parameters of RS and SS, and gives A2 the private key s of RS, we define 
RS’s  system public parameters are <G1,G2, eˆ ,q,P,Ppub,H1,H2,H3> and SS’s system public parameters are 
<G1-2,G2-2, 2eˆ ,q2,P2,Ppub-2,H1-2,H2-2,H3-2> 
The algorithm C selects one random integersτ from {1,2 , …, qn} and works by interacting with Ai as 
follows, where A2 doesn’t need to access Private-Key-Extract and Public-Key-Replace oracles: 
Create-User: C chooses one random numbers ib∈  {1, 2, …, qc} first. At the ib-th query, C sets sU= ⊥ , 
IDb=IDU and PKU=aP. For others queries, C chooses a random number sU∈ *qZ and computes PKU= sUP. 
In both cases, C adds (IDU, sU, PKU) into the list Lu and returns PKU to Ai. 
H1 queries: C chooses a random number w∈ *qZ , and sets H1(IDU)=wP, then C will puts the pair (IDU, 
w, H1(IDU)) in list L1 and answers H1(IDU). 
H3-2 queries: Upon receiving a H3-2 query, C first searches Lh for the tuple with (K1, h), where K1∈G1. 
If the requested input is already on the list, then the corresponding h is returned, otherwise a random 
h∈{0 ,1}n is responded and a new entry is inserted into the list Lh. 
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Public-Key-Replace: C replaces the original public key PKU with 'UPK if IDU has been created. 
Otherwise, C executes Create-User query to generate (IDU, sU, PKU), then sets PKU= 'UPK and adds (IDU, 
sU, 'UPK ) to the Lu. Here, to replace a public key, the password value corresponding to the new public key 
is not required. 
Password-Extract: On a Password-Extract query of IDU, We assume that Create-User query for IDU 
has been asked. If IDU =IDb, then C fails and stops. Otherwise, C searches a pair (IDU, sU, PKU) 
corresponding to IDU in the list Lu, then return sU to Ai. 
Send queries: For any oracle ,nA SSΠ , at theτ -th Send query, C answers by R2=bP. For others queries, 
C chooses a random number di∈ *qZ and answers diP. 
Reveal queries: Upon receiving a Reveal query, C outputs the appropriate session key, except if Ai 
asks the oracle ,A SSτΠ to ask the Test query, then C aborts. 
Test queries: At some point in the simulation, Ai will ask a single Test query of some oracle. If Ai 
does not choose the guessed oracle ,A SSτΠ  to ask the Test query, then C aborts; otherwise, C randomly 
picks a value β from the session key space and responds to Ai with β. 
Output: At the end of the game, the algorithm Ai outputs its guess. 
Solving the CDH Problem: C picks a tuple of the form (K1,h) from Lh and returns K1 as the response 
to the CDH challenge.  
Now we evaluate the probability that C does not abort, Note that C fails if Ai has asked a Private-Key-
Extract query on IDb. We know that the probability for C not to fail is (qc-qp)/qc; Further, if the test 
session is the τ -th oracle, then the simulation goes through. The probability that the simulator has chosen 
the right session is 1/qn, because a randomly chosen oracle is the initiator of the test session is 1/qn. We 
have: Adv(C does not abort) >(qc-qp)/qc ⋅ 1/ nq =(qc-qp)/ (qc ⋅ qn) 
According to the simulation of the Send query, the test oracle ,A SSτΠ  must have obtained the value 
R2=bP. The oracle should hold an authentication value Auth of the form H3-2(K1), in which K1=abP. 
Let Ĥ be the event that abP as K1 has been queried to H3-2. Because H3-2 is a random oracle, we have 
P[Ai wins|¬Ĥ] = 1/2. Then  
P[Ai wins]= P[Ai wins|¬Ĥ]P[¬Ĥ] + P[Ai wins|Ĥ]P[Ĥ]≤ P[Ai wins|¬Ĥ]P[¬Ĥ] + P[Ĥ]=1/2+ 1/2(P[Ĥ]) 
It follows that P[Ĥ] ≥ 2Adv(Ai).Combining all the above results, we have that C solves the CDH 
problem with probability at least 2( ) ( ) / ( )c p i c nq q Adv A q q− ⋅ , contradicting to the hardness of the CDH 
problem. 
4. Protocol Comparison 
In this section, we compare the efficiency of our scheme with Yoon and Yoo’s scheme [6] regarding 
the security and computation overheads not including precomputation overheads. We use notations mul, 
add, bp and h as abbreviations for multiplication in G1, addition in G1, bilinear pairing operation and one-
way hash function operation respectively. 
As shown in the Table 1, both schemes do not require expensive bilinear pairing operation on the client 
side, which makes them more efficient than others schemes [1, 3]. Compared with the Yoon and Yoo’s 
scheme, our scheme enjoys less operation cost. Moreover, our scheme can be used to mutual authentication 
and key agreement between members of distinct domains using different system parameters, and our 
scheme is secure against an uncertified user and a malicious registration server simultaneously. Hence, 
consider the wireless user with limited computing capability and communication security it may be that our 
authentication and key agreement scheme is more applicable. 
Table 1. A comparison of efficiency 
Yoon and Yoo’s scheme [6] Our scheme
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Client 4mul+add+2h 3mul+add+3h
Server 2mul+add+2bp+2h 2mul+2bp+3h
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed an authentication and key agreement mechanism for multi-domain 
wireless networks using bilinear pairings based on certificateless public key cryptography. We have shown 
that the proposed scheme is secure against an uncertified user and a malicious registration server 
simultaneously under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle. By exploiting 
the certificateless public key cryptography system, our scheme successfully eliminates the key escrow 
issue which is inherent in identity-based cryptography. In the proposed scheme, we shift the computational 
burden to the server; moreover, our scheme adopts CL-based short signatures to further induce the user 
computational cost. As a result, the computational cost required by the user is reduced to be well suited for 
smart cards. As compared with the recently proposed schemes, our scheme has better performance in term 
of the security and computation overheads. 
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